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E D I T O R I A L
Bioethics met its COVID-19 Waterloo: The doctor knows best 
again
The late Robert Veatch, one of the United States’ founders of bio-
ethics, never tired of reminding us that the paradigm-shifting contri-
bution that bioethics made to patient care was to liberate patients 
out of the hands of doctors, who were traditionally seen to know 
best, even when they decidedly did not know best. It seems to us 
that with the advent of COVID-19, health policy has come full-circle 
on this.
COVID-19 gave rise to a large number of purportedly “ethical” 
guidance documents aiming to assist health care providers and prac-
titioners with responding to the ethical challenges that might arise 
in their response to the pandemic. Ethics has two primary functions: 
provide clear action guidance, and provide clear action justification. 
The documents in question arguably reflect the ultimate policy tri-
umph of bioethical “principlism,” and, perhaps surprisingly, as a cor-
ollary, the ultimate triumph of “doctor-knows-best.”
Those involved in drafting the documents exploited a well-es-
tablished conceptual flaw of principle-based approaches to health 
policy and bioethical principlism more generally: you grab a bag full 
of—typically nice sounding, but conflicting and disparate—“ethical 
principles,” then tell people to keep them and their under-specified 
obligations in mind when faced with a particular ethical problem, and 
tick the ones they have used off their list. We cannot go here into a 
detailed analysis of each of the many COVID-19 ethical guidance 
documents, but we suggest that they share a number of features 
that probably explain why principlism is deployed as the convenient 
ethics component. On each occasion a number of well-sounding 
principles, that most reasonable people would have great difficulty 
finding fault with, are added—as a kind of preface—to what would 
otherwise be highly controversial policy documents. These princi-
ples are typically in conflict (think autonomy and beneficence, or 
utility and equity).1 It is unclear how they relate to each other. And, 
in cases where two or more principles result in conflicting action 
guidance, we are no clearer about which of them ought to be priori-
tized. Most importantly, such principles do not, when specified to 
the degree that they tend to be in ethical guidelines, provide a clear-
cut and conclusive answer to the question of who, in the here and 
now, should be offered treatment or a vaccine when it is not possible 
to treat or vaccinate all those who could benefit.
Although many of the ethical guidance documents that have 
been developed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are reason-
able, their “ethics” label is typically misleading, because they fail on 
the action guidance criterion, the action justification criterion, or on 
both of these counts. Let us have a look at our first exhibit: the 
“Preliminary guidance on key populations for early COVID-19 immu-
nization” issued by the Government of Canada’s National Health 
Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI).2 The question this 
document tackles is a serious one: given the initially limited availabil-
ity of COVID-19 vaccines, who should receive them first? What we 
are faced with here is a typical question of justice in resource alloca-
tion decision-making. NACI has produced what it refers to—some-
what optimistically—as an “algorithm” outlining the process of 
applying its Ethics, Equity, Feasibility and Acceptability (EEFA) 
framework to this question. In relation to each of a number of listed 
ethical principles, the guidelines provide a series of questions that 
NACI has considered, and, subsequently, detail the ways in which 
those considerations have been addressed (appendix B of the guid-
ance). For instance, in relation to the principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence, NACI asks, “Have the recommendations consid-
ered risks and benefits, and do benefits outweigh risks? Has the 
principle of reciprocity been considered to minimize harm, especially 
in epidemic contexts?”. In response, NACI states that “risks and ben-
efits have been considered in the guidance and summarized in the 
rationale for each recommendation. The ethical principles of propor-
tionality, effectiveness, precaution and reciprocity have been ap-
plied to the guidance and explicitly discussed.”
A key problem with the NACI guidance, one that is typical of 
many “ethical” guidelines developed in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, is that it does not detail the ways in which the competing 
moral obligations of its disparate ethical principles have been bal-
anced with one another nor how potential conflicts between the 
principles have been resolved. For instance, it is unclear how NACI 
have balanced the principle of “reciprocity,” according to which the 
“disproportionate burden[s] faced by those taking on additional risks 
to protect the public” should be minimized, with its justice-derived 
 1For an example of an ethical guidance document that generates the latter conflict, see 
Ontario Health. (2020). Optimizing care through COVID-19 transmission scenarios: 
recommendations from Ontario Health. Retrieved from https://www.ontar iohea lth.ca/
sites/ ontar iohea lth/files/ 2020-10/Optim izing %20Car e%20Thr ough%20COV ID-19%20
Tra nsmis sion%20Sce narios_EN.pdf (accessed Nov 19, 2020).
 2National Health Advisory Committee on Immunization. (2020). Preliminary guidance on 
key populations for early COVID-19 immunization. Retrieved from https://www.canada.
ca/en/publi c-healt h/servi ces/immun izati on/natio nal-advis ory-commi ttee-on-immun izati 
on-naci/guida nce-key-popul ation s-early -covid -19-immun izati on.html (accessed Nov 19, 
2020).
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claim that “treating people and groups with equal concern and re-
spect entails setting and applying prioritization criteria fairly.”
Unsurprisingly, the guidance fails to meet the justification stan-
dard. Nowhere is it explicitly detailed how, in what ways and by what 
means the “ethical principles of proportionality, effectiveness, pre-
caution and reciprocity have been applied to the guidance.” The ac-
tual recommendations may well be a result of the application of the 
aforementioned “algorithm,” but it is impossible evaluate that, be-
cause NACI does not undertake—let alone make explicit—the neces-
sary work to provide that crucial justification. A case in point, 
“effectiveness” is not a self-evident principle; it is relative to some 
purpose.3 There is no single property that is “effectiveness,” and dif-
ferent conceptions of effectiveness entail different normative 
commitments.
This Canadian government guidance document for COVID-19 
vaccine distribution is, in reality, a policy document that hides the 
undisclosed metaethical standards (if there are any) by which its “al-
gorithm” have been applied. Something similar can be said of many 
such guidance documents. Let us—very briefly—look at exhibit B,4 
again from Canada, this time from the province of British Columbia. 
The question it aims to address is whether health care professionals 
have a duty to provide care to COVID-19 patients.5 Its surprising 
conclusion is that health care professionals have such an obligation 
unless they face “certain and significant harm.” This is a standard 
designed to maximize the number of health care professionals re-
quired to report for duty. Given the absence of certainty when it 
comes to both infection risk as well as the absence of certainty when 
it comes to actual development of significant illness, it would be dif-
ficult for most health care professionals to be exempted. Among the 
“core” public health ethics principles “justifying” this conclusion are 
newcomers to the ethical principle rodeo, like “flexibility” and “work-
ing together,” next to more standard fare principles like utility maxi-
mization and respect for autonomy. The latter two are 
uncontroversially conflicting ideas. How should they be resolved 
(keeping in mind that no less than the lives of health care workers are 
at stake)? Well, the decider, likely a health care facility manager, will 
identify the applicable—probably conflicting—principles, and priori-
tize (somehow). As ever with principlist approaches to health policy, 
the priorities-setting strategy and the decision justification are as 
arbitrary as someone flipping a coin.
These problems have been compounded in the case of COVID-
19 guidelines in the UK. In the absence of authoritative guidelines 
from the UK government, the void has been filled by separate docu-
ments produced by the devolved governments in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland,6 as well as ethical guidance documents issued by 
professional organizations, such as the Royal College of Physicians 
(supported by 15 other professional bodies),7 and the British Medical 
Association.8 Although there is a degree of overlap in the ethical 
principles employed in these respective guidelines, certain princi-
ples are mentioned in one but not others, and the specifications of 
the principles vary in ways that can have significant normative impli-
cations. Take, for example, the principle of “fairness,” which is speci-
fied in various different ways:
• “Every person should be treated justly as an individual so that 
decisions are rational, fair, practical, and grounded in appropriate 
processes, available evidence and a clear justification. Everyone 
matters equally, so people with an equal chance of benefiting from 
health and social care resources should have an equal chance of 
receiving them. Any assessments of potential benefits and harms 
from a health or social care intervention or its timing must respect 
individual rights” (Northern Ireland Department of Health);
• “Patients should be treated as individuals, with respect for their 
autonomy, and not discriminated against” (Scottish Government);
• “Frontline staff, policymakers, management and government have 
a responsibility to patients to ensure that any system used to as-
sess patients for escalation or de-escalation of care does not dis-
advantage any one group disproportionately. Treatment should 
be provided, irrespective of the individual’s background (eg dis-
ability), where it is considered that it will help the patient survive 
and not harm their long-term health and wellbeing” (Royal College 
of Physicians);
• “Everyone matters equally. People with an equal chance of ben-
efiting from a resource should have an equal chance of receiving 
it – although it is not unfair to ask people to wait if they could get 
the same benefit later” (British Medical Association).
Even in the case of a single principle such as fairness, the differ-
ent specifications make it extremely difficult for health care provid-
ers and practitioners to navigate between the different guidelines, 
leading to conflicting obligations: treating patients as individuals 
with respect for their autonomy, and providing a resource when they 
 3Ashcroft, R. (2002). What is clinical effectiveness? Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33(2), 219–233; Upshur, R. (2013). What does public 
health ethics tell (or not tell) us about intervening in non-communicable diseases? Journal 
of Bioethical Inquiry, 10(1), 19–28.
 4British Columbia Ministry of Health Provincial COVID-19 Task Force. (2020). COVID-19 
ethics analysis: What is the ethical duty of health care workers to provide care during 
COVID-19 pandemic? Retrieved from https://www2.gov.bc.ca/asset s/gov/healt h/about 
-bc-s-healt h-care-syste m/offic e-of-the-provi ncial -healt h-offic er/covid -19/duty_to_care_
during_covid_march_28_2020.pdf (accessed Nov 19, 2020).
 5Schuklenk, U. (2020). What healthcare professionals owe us: Why their duty to treat 
during a pandemic is contingent on personal protective equipment (PPE). Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 46, 432–435.
 6Scottish Government. (2020). COVID-19 guidance: Ethical advice and support 
framework. Retrieved from https://www.gov.scot/publi catio ns/coron aviru s-covid 
-19-ethic al-advic e-and-suppo rt-frame work/ (accessed Nov 19, 2020); Department of 
Health. (2020). COVID-19 guidance: Ethical advice and support framework. Retrieved 
from https://www.healt h-ni.gov.uk/sites/ defau lt/files/ publi catio ns/healt h/COVID 
-19-Guida nce-Ethic al-Advic e-and-Suppo rt%20Fra mework.pdf (accessed Nov 19, 2020).
 7Royal College of Physicians. (2020). Ethical dimensions of COVID-19 for frontline staff. 
Retrieved from https://www.rcplo ndon.ac.uk/news/ethic al-guida nce-publi shed-front 
line-staff -deali ng-pandemic (accessed Nov 19, 2020).
 8British Medical Association. (2020). COVID-19 – ethical issues. A guidance note. 
Retrieved from https://www.bma.org.uk/media/ 2226/bma-covid -19-ethic s-guida nce.
pdf (accessed Nov 19, 2020).
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have an equal chance of benefitting from it as someone else. There 
are, of course, other normatively pertinent considerations that are 
not addressed: what sorts of characteristics define “equality” and 
how can practitioners make that comparison in practice?9 How does 
treating individual patients “equally” in isolated decision-making sit-
uations ensure that the system, within which these decisions take 
place, is “fair”?10 When we take into account the whole range of eth-
ical principles being employed across these policy documents, and 
the differences between them, then the proliferation of ethical prin-
ciples from different sources can generate conflicts and confusion, 
and increase the risk of inconsistency.11
A long-standing criticism among philosopher-bioethicists of prin-
ciplist approaches to health policy decision-making has been that if 
one designs an ethical guidance document that consists of conflict-
ing normative rules or principles (note the seemingly arbitrary iden-
tification/selection process for these principles), one needs to 
furnish that document with clear guidance on how to resolve those 
conflicts. In the absence of explicit criteria for weighing and balanc-
ing competing ethical demands, one ends up with a guidance docu-
ment that is unable to provide any explicitly justifiable ethical 
guidance to begin with. The result is that health care providers and 
practitioners are left to make adjudications and trade-offs on their 
own.12 This means that policymakers, although purporting to “know 
best” to the extent that they have identified, selected and (under-)
specified the ethical principles that they believe should guide health 
care providers and practitioners, can take minimal credit for guiding, 
and no credit for justifying, the decisions that are made at the coal 
face. In practice then, bioethical principlism and COVID-19 health 
policy guidance documents based on it, have taken us full-circle back 
to the policy of doctor-knows-best when it comes to patient care, 
and local health care providers know best when it comes to deci-
sions about who will be the first to receive vaccination against 
COVID-19, who must report for duty in high risk environments, 
whether non-COVID related services and interventions will be 
de-prioritized and who will and won’t receive them, etc. The only 
difference to the bad old days is that today’s policies are better cam-
ouflaged by combining high-flying ethical principles with “pream-
bles,” “prefaces,” “frameworks,” and, courtesy of NACI, “algorithms.”
Although the effect of principlism on COVID-19 health policy is 
to put the onus squarely on local hospitals, medical teams and doc-
tors to deliver answers to the ethical dilemmas they face, the policy 
of “doctor-knows-best” that these policy documents have fomented 
also implies that “policymakers know best.” Those that have written 
these guidelines are fully aware that the success of the documents in 
terms of helping resolve ethical dilemmas depends on health care 
provider and practitioner uptake and the cooperation of patients 
and the public. For instance, as the British Medical Association rec-
ognizes, “citizens accept[ing] the fairness and legitimacy of alloca-
tion decisions” will depend on them being “informed beforehand of 
the anticipated response,” and “transparent and accountable deci-
sion-making processes, including explicit discussion of the ethical 
principles and reasoning upon which decisions are made.”13 To the 
extent that policymakers like the British Medical Association are 
providing that information, then they probably consider it likely that 
these guidelines will lead to greater acceptance. However, policy-
makers cannot presume on the face of the guidelines as they are that 
patients, and the broader public, will, in fact, agree with them.14 If 
policymakers don’t have good reasons to believe that the public will 
agree with them or if members of the public cannot determine, on 
the face of the documents, how the ethical principles will be applied 
by those who are charged with their care, then these guidelines will 
require substantial public consultation and input before policymak-
ers can draw any reasonable conclusions regarding public accep-
tance. Otherwise, it is clear who thinks they know best.
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